York Dispatch

As QRT use grows, where are limits?

Wednesday, January 12, 2005 - Quick Response Team stories are common news fare these days. Last week such units were called out twice in York County -- one for a 13-hour incident, the other just five.

The first, on Thursday, led to the arrest on South Queen Street of a Harrrisburg man on assault and burglary charges. Two suspected accomplices weren't found.

Then on Sunday, after another QRT response, a second man was arrested in connection with the earlier standoff -- this time after a standoff of his own in which tear gas was thrown and flash grenades were used.

The York County QRT, in two standoffs, had their men -- two of them.

The system apparently worked -- although the first one went on for eight hours after the lone suspect was arrested --but are such situations the reasons for forming and using such teams?

The system didn't work so well in Dauphin County's Swatara Township just after Christmas when that area's QRT surrounded a house for more than 10 hours, and evacuated residents in a two-block area -- only to find their quarry had flown. He was arrested several days later, quietly, at a motel.

Back in York County we have the tragic -- and as yet unexplained -- case of Yvonne Gouseff, shot and killed by a county QRT officer last September.

Officials have yet to reveal why the woman was killed or what threat -- alone in her own home -- she posed to the community, or the justification for forcing a possibly violent confrontation.

And again the question: Was that situation one that called for a quick response team? We seldom hear the term "SWAT" team any more. It's an acronym for special weapons and tactics -- a specialized, highly trained unit used to resolve extremely dangerous situations requiring tactics and weapons not normally available to patrol officers.

Membership in such an elite unit originally called for law enforcement officers highly trained in handling crisis intervention by negotiation or, if necessary, assault.

Supporters of the teams say they're the price we pay in a post-9/11 world. That's an easy rationalization.

Actually it began in the 1960s when Los Angeles police decided the best way to deal with rioters in the volatile Watts district was by using a highly mobile, military-style attack squad.

The idea caught on and thanks to television every department began to itch for the day when they could have their own such unit, or be part of one.

Supporters of the concept saw such units as invaluable in engaging barricaded and heavily-armed criminals and rescuing hostages.

That's hardly the case today. Endings to QRT-involved incidents hardly meet such criteria, as witness the Gouseff slaying or even the case of the Swatara Township suspect that wasn't there.

Law-enforcement enthusiasm for having and using a QRT unit with its military discipline and heavy weaponry is understandable. But if officials' use of such teams is going to become more common, as it seems, and perhaps more concentrated on situations where previously a lower level of police response was adequate, where are the guidelines?

When is a threat level sufficient to order QRTs into action? No doubt many instances offer an excellent training opportunity. But every such opportunity also carries the risk of a mistake -- possibly a fatal one.

Recent QRT actions here and elsewhere highlight the need for a tightening of operational guidelines, and more reporting to funding authorities on when and if use of those teams is really necessary for public safety.

And if the use of such units for lower-level incidents is going to be commonplace in the neighborhood, such guidelines should be a matter of public record.

Meanwhile, York County awaits the report of the Pennsylvania State Police and District Attorney Stan Rebert on the slaying of Elaine Gouseff four months ago.